After Repeated Crises, Boeing Looks to Turn a Corner

One morning this month, a bay door opened at an enormous Boeing airplane factory north of Seattle, where workers rolled in an emerald-green fuselage.
It was only the second 737 Max to enter production at this factory in Everett, Wash., and it was a milestone of sorts for Boeing.
Ever since the 737 debuted in 1967, the plane has been almost exclusively produced in a factory in Renton, a Seattle suburb. But Renton is nearing its capacity, and the addition of a second production site in Everett will help Boeing fulfill its ambitions to build more of the 737 Max, by far its most popular plane.
More broadly, the expansion of the 737’s production is a sign of the progress Boeing has made as part of its turnaround efforts more than two years after its last major crisis. In January 2024, a poorly installed panel blew off a 737 Max jet during a flight, unleashing renewed federal oversight and public scrutiny of Boeing. At the time, the company had only just started to recover meaningfully from a much more serious crisis prompted by Max crashes in 2018 and 2019, in which 346 people died.
The panel episode led Boeing to shake up its leadership, culture and practices yet again, and those changes appear to be paying off. Boeing delivered 314 jets in the first half of the year, its best performance for that period since 2018. Earlier this year, it had $576 billion worth of commercial plane orders, its most ever.
“Boeing is on a very upward trajectory,” said Jerry Lundquist, an industry consultant whose firm, the Lundquist Group, advises aerospace company executives but does not currently work for Boeing. “It certainly hasn’t gotten to smooth, stable, sustained cruise yet, but it’s continuing to do well. It’s a very good story.”
It helps that airlines are desperate for new jets to satisfy growing global travel demand. Hundreds of more orders for planes are expected in the coming days as Boeing and other companies gather at an airport near London for one of the world’s largest aerospace events, the biennial Farnborough International Airshow.
“It has been a particularly strong order frenzy,” Stuart Hatcher, the chief economist and chief data officer at IBA, an aviation advisory firm, said during a webinar this week.
In most cases, an airplane order that is placed today for a jet made by Boeing or its European rival, Airbus, is not expected to be fulfilled until the 2030s. Still, Boeing lags behind Airbus, which has received more than twice as many plane orders this year and has a larger order backlog.
Despite that disparity, Boeing is working through its own backlog of about 6,200 airplane orders. That’s good news for its bottom line. But Boeing executives have warned that its commercial plane unit won’t generate consistent profits for a while, partly because of investments like the $1 billion the company spent to expand the production of the Max in Everett.
About 1,000 employees are supporting the effort. Half of the mechanics building the plane worked previously in Renton, while the other half are new hires, according to Jennifer Boland-Masterson, a senior director overseeing the expansion.
The Federal Aviation Administration is auditing the process and must sign off on the production line, known as the North Line, before planes built here can be delivered. But the work has already started, slowly, and Boeing says nearly every part of the process mirrors that of the three Max production lines in Renton.
The work is being carried out in a space formerly used to build the much larger 787 Dreamliner, a twin-aisle plane whose production was consolidated to a factory in South Carolina. Boeing also makes the 777, 767 freighter and KC-46A Pegasus military tanker in Everett. The factory, which the Guinness World Records describes as the world’s largest by volume, was also once home to the iconic 747, the last of which was delivered in 2023.
The 737 Max accounts for about 70 percent of Boeing’s commercial aircraft backlog. Deliveries of the plane were frozen for almost two years after the fatal crashes. During that time, regulators required Boeing to make several changes to the plane, which started flying again in late 2020.
After the 2024 panel blowout, in which no one was seriously injured, the F.A.A. capped Max production at 38 planes per month until the agency was satisfied that Boeing had improved manufacturing quality. The company later put in place a quality-control regimen it described as a “war on defects,” and the F.A.A. cleared Boeing late last year to produce 42 jets per month, and 47 per month this year.
Boeing is working toward reaching a sustained rate of 47 planes per month, and the Everett line was added to help the company reach its next goal of making 52 per month and eventually more.
“It’s pretty important,” said Sheila Kahyaoglu, an equity analyst at the financial services firm Jefferies who focuses on aerospace and defense companies. “Going up in rate is super helpful.”
Ms. Kahyaoglu estimates that each delivered 737 can generate $10 million to $20 million in cash after accounting for necessary costs and investments.
While Boeing has made progress on Max production, it has been hampered by three long-delayed planes. But the company now says it is nearing certification of each.
Boeing said the certification work on the smallest and largest Max variants, the Max 7 and Max 10, was very far along. The company also said it was making substantial progress on the 777-9, a behemoth designed for long-distance international travel. All three planes are years behind schedule, but Boeing said it expected to begin deliveries of each next year.
“The path is clear,” Mike Sinnett, a Boeing senior vice president, told reporters this month. “We know what we have to do. We meet with the F.A.A. very, very regularly.”
The Max 10 will ship with a new system that was required as a result of the crashes. That system, known as Enhanced Angle of Attack, is designed to simplify the alerts that pilots receive when an error is detected with a sensor that measures the plane’s angle relative to oncoming airflow, known as the angle of attack.
Investigators have said multiple alerts related to faulty data from that sensor made it harder for the pilots in the fatal crashes to respond. Once certified, the new system is expected to be added to all Max planes within two years.
Both the Max 7 and Max 10 will also feature a fix to the engine anti-ice system to address concerns about overheating in certain conditions.
The 777-9, a twin-aisle plane capable of carrying more than 400 passengers over long distances, is also making progress, the company said. The plane has taken more than 1,700 test flights, and Boeing says it expects to deliver its first 777-9 next year.
On a lot near the Everett factory, Boeing is subjecting a 777-9 airplane to tests that simulate real-world flying, including flexing its wings and body and repeated pressurization and depressurization of its cabin. So far, that airplane has endured the equivalent of nearly twice as many flights as the company expects it ever to operate with no major structural defects.
Since the 2024 panel incident, Boeing has also worked to revamp manufacturing quality and corporate culture. The company replaced several top executives, expanded training and inspections, simplified documentation and reduced allowances for certain work to be performed out of sequence. Boeing said that, as a result, in the first three months of the year employees spent nearly 20 percent less time fixing defects or repairing or replacing parts on the 737 line than they did in the same period last year.
Boeing has also intervened more in its suppliers’ operations in an effort to improve quality and capacity issues. In 2025, it bought a struggling supplier, Spirit AeroSystems, which made the Max fuselage. Boeing said the number of fuselages arriving with defects this year had fallen 40 percent compared with 2025.
And in an effort to improve its culture, the company solicited feedback over many months from tens of thousands of employees. That process resulted in the company’s devising five guiding values and 15 recommended behaviors for employees.
Those guidelines are mostly straightforward and conventional like “follow through” and “collaborate respectfully.” But one speaks bluntly to the frustrations of workers who have endured repeated crises, and to the company’s push to regain public trust: “Give a damn!”